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INTRODUCTION

The writer's task in drafting a contract is, first and foremost, to ensure that
the expectations of the client are met. The words of the contract must at a
minimum accurately reflect the client's desires and memorialize the client's
intentions. In peripheral areas where the client has no discernable preference,
the contract should promote the client's general interests as the lawyer
understands them. The lawyer must write with confidence that the chosen
words will be construed by subsequent readers in a predictable way that
coincides with those interests. Drafters cannot, of course, guarantee that the
words will convey their intended meaning to all subsequent readers, but they
should strive to be as confident as possible.
Black letter law holds that subsequent readers will attempt to construe the
contract in a way that implements the intent of the parties.' We know that in
practice, however, the intentionalist view is more fiction than fact.2 Several
circumstances can make an attempt to reconstruct contractual intent difficult or
impossible. The parties may have attached different meanings to a word or
phrase at the very outset when they signed the agreement, not saying anything
or even knowing each other's divergent thoughts at the time. Therefore, there
is no common intent to discover. Perhaps more likely, the parties and their
counsel did not even think about the meaning of a particular word or phrase
because they did not deem it important when the contract was written, only to
discover later that a dispute has arisen involving that very language. On the
other hand, the parties may actually have shared a common meaning of the
language when the contract was made, but this knowledge has long been lost,
forgotten, or so obscured by subsequent events that it is essentially unprovable.
If a dispute has arisen, one party may now deny an asserted meaning, or at the
very least, seek to recast the "mutual understanding" in a different light.
Despite the uncertainties inherent in the intentionalist model, someone
(perhaps a judge or jury) may be in the position of deciding what the contract
means at a time when something important is at stake. The contract reader will
interpret the agreement's meaning by looking at the text, examining any related
documents, listening to those who were involved in the contract's creation, and

1. See, e.g., Sco'r J. BURNHAM, THE CONTRACT DRAFTING GUIDEBOOK 151 (1992)

(effectuating the intent of the parties).
2. Cf. James P. Nehf, Textualism in the Lower Courts: Lessons from Judges
InterpretingConsumerLegislation,26 RuTGERs L.J. 1, 9-17 (1994) (discussing intentionalism
in the context of statutory and contract interpretation).
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consulting trade usages and other outside sources. In the end, the reader will
proclaim the meaning of the agreement and hold the parties to the ensuing
consequences. Although the decision maker will often use intentionalist
rhetoric in resolving the dispute ("the parties' intent was ...
,,),3
the proclaimed
meaning may have little to do with the actual understanding of those who
signed the document. Nevertheless, the parties will be bound by the proclaimed
meaning as if they had actually intended it from the start. The lawyer's goal,
in this sense, is to ensure that the ultimate declaration of meaning does not
come as an unwelcome surprise. If it does, then the lawyer may wish that she
had drafted the contract differently.
This paper provides guidance to the contact drafter who would like to
avoid unwelcome surprises. A careful drafter should try to eliminate as many
interpretive uncertainties as possible thereby limiting the range of interpretive
choices for subsequent readers. Careful drafting requires the drafter to think
about the contract from the perspective of all persons that may later be called
upon to interpret it. They include the parties themselves, who may read the
contract as a blueprint for governing their actions in an ongoing relationship;
the parties' successors in interest, who may not be aware of the circumstances
present when the contract was made and who will therefore look more closely
at the words in isolation or in the context of contemporary conditions; judges,
arbitrators, or other decision makers, who may be called upon to resolve a
dispute by construing the agreement in light of the language, context, and
pertinent legal rules; and government regulators or other oversight bodies, who
may read the contract with public policy concerns in mind.
The contract will mean something different to each audience because each
will have a different frame of reference and purpose for examining it. The
parties themselves will be greatly influenced by the circumstances existing at
the time it was made, probably more so than later assignees or a judge who
learns of those circumstances only indirectly and long after they occurred. A
court may be guided by rules of construction and legal precedents largely
unknown to the parties when the contract is signed. Regulatory bodies may
look at the agreement in light of policy objectives not envisioned when the
contract was made. A careful drafter should anticipate the potential audiences
and try to ensure that all readers will understand and apply the contract in the
client's interest. This means drafting the contract with an imaginative eye that
places the drafter in the position of each potential reader.
This is no simple task, and no formula for success exists. Good drafting
takes care, practice, soundjudgment, and a lot of effort. Many useful texts exist

3. According to the LEXIS research service (Combined Federal and State Case LawU.S. Library and Federal and State case Law file), judges have referred to the "parties' intent"
or "intent of the parties" in thousands of opinions.
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that provide guidance, tips, and shortcuts.4 Form books and computer software
can create efficiencies, though they can also introduce mistakes if relied upon
carelessly. Most importantly, however, the drafter must train herself to be
forward-thinking. For some, this skill comes naturally. For most, it requires a
considerable amount of work and preparation.
This paper presents several guidelines that can help create this forwardthinking mindset and reduce uncertainty in contract drafting. In particular,
writers of contracts should make a deliberate effort to do the following:
"

Carefully consider the role of each structural component of
the contract, especially the parts that are often hastily
assembled but can later become outcome determinative.
"Recital" clauses or "boilerplate" that get little attention inthe
drafting stage can generate unwelcome surprises later.
" Remember that style is important in conveying meaning.
Using understandable, consistent language with clarity of
terms and syntax can minimize the likelihood of future
disputes and misunderstandings.
" Keep in mind the standard tools of contract construction
courts will likely use if the contract results in litigation. Any
literate person can draft a contract. A lawyer is hired in part
because she has good writing skills and a background in the
legal rules governing contract interpretation.
" Develop a routine for keeping current on relevant statutory
mandates and case law precedent beyond the standard rules
of construction. Many words and phrases are either required
or prohibited by statute or have been construed by courts in
published opinions, sometimes in counterintuitive ways.
Using particular words and phrases without understanding
their required usage or generally accepted meaning can lead
to embarrassing and costly judgments down the road.

By keeping these guidelines in mind while writing a contract, the drafter
can be more confident that the client's expectations will ultimately be fulfilled
and that any unwelcome surprises in the future will be fewer and less costly.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF RECITALS AND BOILERPLATE
Whether drafting a contract from scratch or marking one up from a preexisting form, lawyers and their clients tend to focus intensely on the middle

4. See, e.g., BURNHAM, supra note 1; ScoTrJ. BURNHAM, DRAFTING CONTRACTS (2d
ed. 1993); BARBARA CHILD, DRAFTING LEGAL DOCUMENTS: PRINCIPLES & PRACTICES (2d ed.
1992); REED DICKERSON, MATERIALS ON LEGAL DRAFTING (1981); RICHARD C. WYDICK, PLAIN
ENGLISH FOR LAWYERS (4th ed. 1998).
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or "operative" portions of the agreement and more casually on the introductory
references and concluding terms. A cautious drafter realizes that all words in
a contract are important because every word can be influential, even pivotal,
in affecting the outcome of a dispute.
A. Recitals
A contract may begin with a series of recitals or statements setting forth the
circumstances under which it is made (e.g., "Whereas the Lightning Electric
Company is desirous of securing a reliable supply of coal.. ."). Such recitals
can be used effectively to declare the motivations of the parties and the
purposes of the contract. Because recitals seldom contain promissory language
obligating a party to do something, they are often assembled without much
thought and are unlikely to be the subject of extensive negotiation. However,
they can be given great weight by a court as it tries to determine the intent of
the parties or resolve ambiguities.5 A court might also use statements of the
parties' desires and purposes as guideposts for assessing whether someone is
performing the contract in good faith. Therefore, a careful drafting attorney will
take time to ensure that the recitals not only accurately and completely state the
intentions and purposes of the client, but also provide sufficient authority to
support later interpretations in the client's favor on close issues where the
operative language is unclear.
At the very least, recitals should be clear and consistent with the operative
parts of the agreement. If there are inconsistencies and the operative language
is clear, the operative language will govern construction.6 If the operative

5. See, e.g., Schnitt v. McKellar, 427 S.W.2d 202, 206-08 (Ark. 1968) (stating that
contract as a whole, including the recital clauses, must be examined to determine the intention
of the parties); GGS Co. v. Masuda, 919 P.2d 1008, 1015 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the
recital evidenced the intent of the parties); Stech v. Panel Mart, Inc., 434 N.E.2d 97, 101 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1982) (stating that recital helped clarify ambiguities in the operative portions of the
contract); State v. City ofBreezy Point, 394 N.W.2d 592,596 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that
recitals may be used to clarify ambiguous language); In re Estate of Peterson, 381 N.W.2d 109,
113 (Neb. 1986) (stating that recitals may be used to determine the intention of the parties);
Erickson Hardwood Co. v. North Pac. Lumber Co., 690 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Or. Ct. App. 1984)
(stating that recitals may help determine the intent of the parties); Levy v. Levy, 388 N.W.2d
170, 175 (Wis. 1986) (stating that the recital may be examined to determine the parties'
intentions); Union Pac. Resources Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 882 P.2d 212, 222 (Wyo. 1994) (stating
that the recital discloses the acknowledgment of certain facts by the parties in estoppel cases);
cf.Edward Pinckney Assocs. v. Carver, 294 S.C. 351, 354, 364 S.E.2d 473, 474-75 (Ct. App.
1987) (holding that when a transaction is documented by several writings, recitals in one may
be explained, amplified, or limited by those in another).
6. See Fugate v. Town of Payson, 791 P.2d 1092, 1093-94 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990);
Stabler v. Ramsay, 62 A.2d 464,470 (Del. Ch.1948), modified on other grounds, 88 A.2d 546
(Del. 1952); Ohio Valley Gas, Inc. v. Blackburn, 445 N.E.2d 1378, 1383 (Ind.Ct. App. 1983);
McKinnonv. Baker, 370 N.W.2d 492,494 (Neb. 1985); Eisenhardtv. Schmidt, 98 A.2d 698,700
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.Div. 1953).
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language is ambiguous, clearly written recitals will usually control.7 Even if the
recitals address matters distinct from the operative provisions, however, they
can create unintended consequences. For instance, a court could use them to
support an estoppel claim in the future. If a recital states that the party is
entering into the contract for the purpose of "securing a reliable supply of
coal," the party may find it difficult to persuade a laterreader that the other side
knew of additional reasons when the parties made the contract. This difficulty
could have significant legal consequences, for example, in a claim for
consequential damages following breach.'
Because recitals can come back to haunt a contracting party, many lawyers
deliberately limit their use. If the contract drafter does not expect to give the
recitals extensive thought and planning, the better course is to use them
sparingly or not at all. The benefits of using well-planned recitals, however,
should exceed the risks. The drafting process permits many opportunities to set
forth the intentions and expectations of the parties with few limitations. Since
later contract readers will be searching for evidence of the parties' intent, the
contract drafter should use recitals to make those intentions absolutely clear.
B. Boilerplate
Most contracts end with standard terms and conditions ("boilerplate"),9
which are also not likely to be reviewed as closely as the operative contract
terms. Although boilerplate terms do not usually become controversial, they
can create unwelcome surprises if not carefully considered. For example, a
typical choice-of-law provision might provide, "This Agreement will be
governed by and construed under the law of the State of Georgia." If the
contract has no connection to any other state, the provision adds nothing
because Georgia law will govern anyway, but if it concerns multistate parties
7. Ex ParteDawes, 17 Q.B.D. 275, 288 (1886); see Scorr J. BURNHAM, DRAFTING
CONTRACTS (TEACHER'S MANUAL) 65 (2d ed. 1993).
8. Courts will award consequential damages only if the loss is reasonably within the
contemplation of the parties, at the time the contract was made, as a probable result of the
breach. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (Ex. 1854); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1981); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.14, at 822-29 (3d ed.
1999).
9. Legal historians have explored the origin of boilerplate used in this legal sense.
Toward the end of the eighteenth century, the technology developed for manufacturing iron
plates for steam engine boilers. After the Civil War, small town newspapers began
supplementing their publications with releases from news syndicates, which they initially sent
in printed form but later shipped in iron casts for ease in printing. Carol Bast, A Short History
of Boilerplate, 5 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 156 (1994-1995). The casts became known as
boilerplates throughout the country because the standardized process ofduplicating the articles
was associated with the process for making the plates for boilers. Id. at 156. Although the term
was used in reference to standard contract provisions not long thereafter, the United States
Supreme Court did not use the term "boilerplate" in a contractual sense until Justice Black's
dissenting opinion in NationalEquipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 328 (1964).
Bast, supra at 156-57.
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or transactions, the provision could change the choice-of-law rules otherwise
governing. This construction may or may not be good for the client. Unless the
drafter understands how potentially important legal rules (e.g., statutes of
limitation, implied duty of good faith, employment-at-will doctrine) will be
affected by the change, she cannot know whether or not Georgia law is good
for the client. Choice-of-law provisions are often inserted for the convenience
of the drafting lawyer who would prefer to litigate in a familiar legal landscape
without considering the effect on the client's interests.
A No-Oral-Modification (NOM) clause is a common provision designed
to prevent the parties from later asserting that the written contract terms were
modified by verbal agreement. A NOM clause may be useful in any contract
because it allows parties to rely on the written document without worrying
about an assertion that a critical provision (e.g., time when payment is due) was
modified casually in a subsequent discussion or phone call." A careful drafter
should consider whether the client is likely to assert an oral modification and
whether the client is likely to abide by the requirement of getting a written
modification when one does occur. If the client's goals are hindered by the
NOM clause, it should not be included.
The same can be said of merger clauses. A clause stating that the entire
agreement is embodied in the writing, and that there are no other agreements
or understandings between the parties, oral or written, can prove helpful in
disproving fraudulent claims or misguided assertions at a later date." Merger
clauses are therefore routinely inserted in contracts today. However, they can
work against a party who is relying on unwritten representations as part of the
motivation for entering into the agreement. It can be a time-consuming task to
draft language covering every understanding between the parties. Usually, the
written contract will embody the essential terms, leaving out other
understandings that are either difficult to put into words or not deemed
important enough to expend the effort. A merger clause makes it harder to
bring those understandings to the attention of a decision maker later on. If this
result poses a significant risk for the client, the best course is to include those
understandings as part of the contract. If inclusion is impractical, the drafter
should consider omitting a merger clause.
Another common boilerplate statement is that "time is of the essence" in
performing the obligations of the agreement. Again, the thoughtful drafter will
ask whether her client or the other party is more likely to have difficulty

10. The NOM clause by no means ensures that a court will ignore an alleged oral
modification. The court could rule that the written requirement was waived by words or conduct
or that the other party is estopped from asserting the benefits of the NOM. See U.C.C. § 2-209
(1987).
11. A merger clause is not foolproof, of course. A court is more likely to enforce it
when it is part of a heavily negotiated contract, but less likely to enforce it in a contract of
adhesion. See, e.g., Robert Childres & Stephen J. Spitz, Statusin the Law of Contract,47 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1,25 (1972) (stating that generally the parol evidence rule is not applicable in adhesion
contracts).
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performing on time. If the client is more likely to be the late performer, the
provision will probably do more harm than good.
A drafting lawyer should also think hard about dispute resolution.
Lawyers should know that standard arbitration clauses are not in every client's
interest. These clauses tend to favor large, institutional clients that are repeat
players in litigation and who may see little benefit from the uncertainties of
judge or jury trials. Even if arbitration is thought to be appropriate, the
language of the arbitration clause should be carefully scrutinized to ensure that
the process and panel will fairly resolve any dispute. The agreement can set
forth specific directions to the arbitrators, such as when arbitration is triggered,
what issues will be arbitrated, how the panel will be chosen, how the results
will be used by the parties, and any other procedural safeguards necessary to
limit the scope of decision making. 2 Clarity is critical, however, because an
arbitration clause is supposed to provide a quick and efficient method for
determining controversies. Efficiencies will be lost ifthere is litigation over the
meaning of a poorly drafted clause. 3
Iml. STYLE Is MORE THAN A PERSONAL PREFERENCE
To the greatest extent possible, contracts should be written in clear,
unambiguous language. Good writing skills and good contract drafting go hand
in hand. Lawyers that write lucid briefs, letters, and memoranda should bring
those same writing skills to the contract-drafting table. Awkward phrasing,
confusing syntax, ambiguous terms, and "legalese" should not creep onto the
page just because the word "Contract" appears at the top. Lawyers know this,
of course. Yet for some reason, they often change style, either intentionally or
through careless habit, and revert to poor writing when drafting "formal"
agreements. A good drafter can guard against this by keeping the following
basic points in mind during the writing process:
*

ask whether any words or phrases can be considered
ambiguous;
" use simple, straightforward language whenever it will do the
job; and
o
resist the temptation to abuse the drafting privilege by using

12. See BURNHAM, supranote 7, at 92.
13. See id. at 126-27. See also Recognition Equip., Inc. v. NCR Corp., 532 F. Supp.
271, 273 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (holding that the dispute in question was properly referable to
arbitration as set out in the arbitration clause of the parties' agreement); F.J. Siller & Co. v. City
of Hart, 255 N.W.2d 347, 348 (Mich. 1977) (holding that "the parties intended the condition
precedent language to preclude a court action regarding disputes within the scope of the
arbitration clause independent of the award"); Trident Technical College v. Lucas & Stubbs,
Ltd., 286 S.C. 98, 103-04, 333 S.E.2d 781, 784-85 (1985) (per curiam) (recognizing that the
policy favoring the arbitration of disputes is well-established in South Carolina state law as well
as by the Federal Arbitration Act, which is equally applicable in state or federal court).
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words and phrases unreasonably unfavorable to the other
party.
A. Avoiding Ambiguity
American contracts tend to be more elaborate than agreements drafted in
other countries.'" We try to cover all the plausible contingencies, resolve all
ambiguities, and spell out the parties' rights and obligations in excruciating
detail. This approach is not necessarily wrong, but it has several consequences.
Our contracts are generally longer. They are more difficult to read. More
attention is paid to the precise language because it is presumed that the words
were chosen carefully. Most importantly, because our judges are accustomed
to construing detailed agreements, the rules governing contract interpretation
have evolved in this context. For better or worse, a contract writer in this
country must be aware of these expectations and draft accordingly.
Nearly all terms are vague to some degree, and some uncertainty will
always exist about how a later reader might interpret a particular word or
phrase. Moreover, many terms are vague for good reason. The law depends to
a large extent on general principles like "good cause" and "gross negligence,""
even though they cannot be clearly defined. Drafters have little incentive to
attempt clarification, as the terms are useful precisely because their meanings
are flexible. For example, when drafting a force majeure clause, the writer
cannot list all possible events that will permit a discharge. Instead, the better
approach is to make the contract flexible using general language and listing
some examples preceded by the phrase "including but not limited to ......
Writers should be careful, however, to distinguish purposefully vague
terms from ambiguous terms that create uncertainty in unintended ways."'
Ambiguous terms or phrases present a choice between alternative meanings.
They are almost always unintended and preventable if the writer recognizes the
ambiguity.' 7 Consider a clause in an employment contract that permits
dismissal if the employee is "convicted of a felony or misdemeanor involving
dishonesty or fraud."' 8 Do felonies have to involve dishonesty or fraud, or only
misdemeanors? If the intent is to allow dismissal for any felony, simply
14.

RICHARD WINCOR, CONTRACTS IN PLAIN ENGLISH 43-44 (1976).
15. See JosephKimble, Answering the CriticsofPlainLanguage,5SCRIBEsJ.LEGAL
WRITING 51, 79 (1994-1995).
16. On the difference between vagueness and ambiguity see REED DICKERSON,THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 52(1975).
17. Occasionally, lawyers will deliberately use ambiguous language. Using the
technique of "calculated ambiguity" can avoid an impasse. The writer may decide that resolving
the ambiguity would imperil negotiations by flagging an issue the parties would rather not
address at the time. The ambiguous term may slip through unnoticed and may never become a
problem if the parties perform the contract. If all goes well, the gamble pays off. If a dispute
arises over the term, a forum beyond the lawyer's control will decide the ambiguity. See
BURNHAM, supra note 7, at 29.
18. The example is modified from Kimble, supra note 15, at 79.
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reversing the order of phrasing could remove the ambiguity: "convicted of a
misdemeanor involving dishonesty or fraud or a felony."' 9
Recognizing and removing ambiguities takes patience, practice, and
experience. It is not always easy to spot an ambiguous word. Most people
would not think the word "chicken" is ambiguous, but the Frigalimentcase
teaches otherwise. 0 Few would imagine that a "crop" could include livestock,
but the dictionary broadly defines the term.2' Cases have been litigated over the
meaning of commonly used words like "indenify,"' which lawyers think
they understand but later discover carry different meanings among those that
use the term.
Identifying ambiguities is often a simple matter of reading through the
document several times and thinking about how others might construe it. It may
be helpful to have the document read by someone that is not intimately familiar
with the circumstances surrounding the transaction. A disinterested reader is
more likely to spot ambiguities that escape the eye of persons more closely
involved. When time and money justify the effort, it may be desirable and
feasible to test the document on several readers by asking them questions to see
if the document clearly conveys its intended meaning. This tactic can be
especially useful when drafting a form contract that will be used in numerous
transactions with consumers. Ambiguities in such contracts will likely be
construed against the drafter, thus giving rise to potential class action liability.
One good drafting habit is to define important words at the beginning of
the contract. Whenever the word is used later, it will carry a precise meaning,
assuming the definition itselfis not ambiguous. Definitions achieve clarity and
consistency, save space, and make the operative provisions easier to read.
However, defined terms must be used precisely and without variation. If the
writer intends a slightly different meaning, she should either not use the defined
term or modify it to convey the intended meaning. A drafter should be careful
to avoid meaningless or "Humpty Dumpty" defmitions.Y This result occurs
when "a term is defined [so broadly that it means virtually] anything the parties
want it to mean."2' Another pitfall is the "one-shot definition, whereby a term

19. Id. at 79-80.
20. Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 117
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) (determining whether a contract for the sale of "chickens" included fryers and
broilers or stewing chicken).
21. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY 271 (1974) (defining crop as "a plant
or animal or plant or animal product that can be grown and harvested extensively for profit or
subsistence.").
22. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage& Rigging Co., 442 P.2d
641, 643 (Cal. 1968) and cases discussed therein that interpret whether the term "indemnify"
covers injury only to third parties or whether it also covers injury to one of the contracting
parties; cf.Carolina Veneer & Lumber Co. v. American Mut. Liab.Ins. Co., 202 S.C. 103, 10912,24 S.E.2d 153, 155-57 (1943) (discussing the meaning of insurance indemnification clause).
23. BURNHAM, supra note 7, at 62.
24. Id.
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is defined to be used only once."'
Using the active, rather than passive, voice can also eliminate ambiguities.
In most cases it is clearer to say, "If a Shareholder transfers one or more Shares
to a Non-shareholder.. ." than to say, "If any Shares are transferred to a Nonshareholder ..... Contemporary writers prefer gender-neutral language over

masculine or feminine if the author intends to cover both-a contract would
refer to the transfer of "shares" rather than "his shares" or "his or her shares."
In most cases, it is better to use singular nouns and verbs rather than plural: "If
a Shareholder transfers.. ." rather than "If Shareholders transfer.. . ." None

of these rules are absolute, of course. The passive voice may be better when the
writer does not want to limit who the actor will be. A masculine or feminine
form may best reflect the parties' intent. Sometimes the plural may be
necessary. The careful drafter will think about these differences and use terms
best suited for the occasion.
Another way to limit ambiguities is to ensure that terms are used
consistently. A basic drafting rule is: "Never change your language unless you
wish to change your meaning, and always change your language if you wish
to change your meaning. 26 In one celebrated case, a crop insurance contract
imposed several obligations on the insured, a tobacco farmer.27 Some of the
obligations stated, "[ilt shall be a condition precedent to . . ." or similar
language, but other obligations did not use the word "condition."2' One
obligation of the latter type required that the farmer preserve his damaged crop
and not plow it under before an adjuster could inspect the property.29 When the
farmer attempted to collect on the policy after plowing the field under, the
insurer denied coverage. The court found for the farmer, concluding that the
no-plowing obligation was not a condition to the insurer's obligation to pay,
but rather it was a promise, the breach of which might give rise to damages
alone.3 ' In the opinion of the appellate court, because other provisions used the
word "condition," the company must have intended this particular provision to
be only a promise. 2 While it seems unlikely that the insurer actually so
intended (and the insured may not have even read this part of the agreement),
the court seized upon the inconsistency to validate its declaration of the parties'
intent.
Finally, although it should be obvious, the contract writer should never use
words casually without fully understanding their meaning. Volumes of
reporters are filled with litigation over jargon that contract drafters casually
inserted into their documents, often with no purpose other than to sound
25. Id.
26. Id. at 169.
27. Howard v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 540 F.2d 695, 696 (4th Cir. 1976).
28. Id. at 696.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 698.
32. Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1999

11

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51: 153

"lawyerly." Seemingly innocuous words like "aforesaid," "and/or," "herein,"
' have been the subject of disputes." In
"whereas," "any and all,"33 and "shall"34
one study of contract cases, researchers found that about 25% of the disputes
involved interpretation problems, with many traceable to incomplete
negotiation or ambiguous drafting. 36 The cautious drafter should strive not to
be counted in that number.
B. Using "PlainLanguage" Without SacriflcingPrecision
Plain language means clear and effective communication-nothing more
or less. Anyone can take provisions from form books,37 add a few customizing
sections, throw in an occasional "whereas" or "herein," and call it a contract.
Simplifying ideas is more difficult than complicating them. While technical
terms of art are sometimes necessary, they account for only a small part of any
contract.3 Using plain language to convey complex ideas can be timeconsuming, but it will pay off with greater comprehension by subsequent
readers.39 The effort can reduce litigation risk and provide for better relations
between the parties as they try to live within the terms of the agreement
throughout the life of the contract.
Most states have enacted laws that require the use of plain language in
certain types of contracts, particularly those with consumers.4 0 Even without a

33. Kimble, supra note 15, at 80.
34. One publication identifies more than 625 cases involving the word "shall" by the
middle of this century. See 39 WORDS AND PHRASES 111-65 (1953).
35. See DAVIDMELLINKOPF,THELANGUAGEOFTHELAW 3O5-10,315,321-25(1963).
36. Kimble, supra note 15, at 80 (citing Harold Shepherd, Book Review, 1 J.LEGAL
EDUC. 151, 154 (1948)).
37. The advantages of using forms are obvious: convenience and efficiency. Forms
that are written by experts in the field will give the drafter confidence that the important
provisions have been included. However, using forms can be dangerous. The legal framework
may have changed since the form was published. The form may not constitute the complete legal
framework for the client's situation. Or the form may simply not be a good fit for the relationship
being created. See Ian R. Macneil, A Primerof ContractPlanning,48 S. CAL. L. REv.627, 655
(1975).
38. One study suggests that technical terms of art account for less than 3% of any
given contract. Kimble, supra note 15, at 54 (citing Benson Barr et al., Legalese and the Myth
of Case Precedent,64 MICH. B.J. 1136, 1137 (1985)).
39. Researchers have studied the effects ofplain language on comprehension. In one
study of legal documents, plain language improved understanding by 140/--in another by
106%. See Kimble, supra note 15, at 64 (citing Michael E.J. Masson & Mary Anne Waldron,
ComprehensionofLegal Contractsby Non-Experts:Effectiveness ofPlain LanguageRedrafting,
8 APPLIED COGNMVE PSYCHOL. 67, 75, 77 (1994)).
40. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-80-201 (Michie 1992) (life and disability
insurance language simplification); IND. CODEANN. § 27-1-26 (Michie 1994) (insurance policy
language simplification); MD.CODE ANN., Insurance § 15-103 (1997) (health insurance language
simplification); OR. Rv. STAT. § 743.350 (1989) (health and life insurance policy
simplification); S.C. CODEANN. § 38-71-510(Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1998) (insurancepolicy
language simplification); W. VA. CODE § 33-29-1 (1996) (accident and sickness insurance policy
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statutory mandate, however, plain language contracts are worth the effort
because, if carefully drafted, they reduce the likelihood ofmisinterpretation by
parties, judges, and other contract readers down the road.4'
Plain language advocates have been criticized through the years as being
naive and unsophisticated, though largely because they have been
misunderstood. Plain language does not mean using only small words and short
sentences. It does not mean oversimplifying difficult concepts, discarding
technical language, and distorting meaning in the process. The goal is to make
writing clearer by restructuring awkward phrasing, reorganizing needlessly
complex passages, and eliminating wordy, meaningless language. Its basic
tenets in the context of contract drafting can be illustrated by the following
common examples:
" "It is further mutually understood and agreedby and between
the parties to this agreement.... . 42 In most cases this entire
clause can be struck. A contract by definition is an agreement
by and between the parties; there is no need to repeat the
obvious.
• "In the case of the failure of the said Purchasers to .... " The
writer can replace the passive voice with, "If Purchasers fail
" "Should the said contingency come to pass .... " Replace
with, "If the contingency occurs .... "
" "[S]ubject and conditioned upon... ." Because it is hard to
imagine a difference between the two, either "subject to" or
"conditioned upon" should suffice.
An equally common problem is the long, complex passage in which the
drafter tries to fit too much into a single paragraph, using an occasional
semicolon or comma in a feeble attempt to separate thoughts. The result is
inevitably a passage that might be deciphered, but only with a great deal of
patience and a keen eye for detail. Consider the following example:
The CONSULTANT agrees to fully complete the described
assignment and finish same to the DEPARTMENT [within
30] calendar days after notification of Approval, it being fully

language simplification).
41. Sources on plain language include CARL FELSENFELD & ALAN SIEGEL, WRITING
CONTRACTS INPLAINENGLISH (1981); DAVIDMELLINKOFF, LEGALWRITING: SENSE &NoNsENsE
(1982); Symposium, PlainEnglish in the Law, 62 MICH. B.J. 942 (1983).
42. BURNHAM, supranote 7, at 10.
43. Id. One of the classics is from Baldwin v. Stuber, 597 P.2d 1135, 1136 (Mo.
1979). The agreement began: "On this date 3-8-77, 1, Terry L. Baldwin, here-to-fore known as
sellor, and Alan D. Stuber, here-to-fore known as sellee, enter into a selling agreement, which
is here-to-fore known as The Natural Look Barber Salon... ." BURNHAM, supranote 7, at 57.
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understood and agreed by the parties hereto that in the event
the CONSULTANT shall fail to do so as aforesaid, the
DEPARTMENT shall, without the necessity of notice,
terminate the services of said CONSULTANT without
incurring any liability for payment for services submitted
after said due date or shall deduct, as a liquidation of
damages, a sum of money equal to one-third of one percent
(1/3 of 1%) per calendar day of the total fee if the
performance of the entire contract is delayed beyond the due
date. Upon written request by the CONSULTANT an
extension of time may be granted by the DEPARTMENT in
writing, in the event the CONSULTANT has not received
from the DEPARTMENT proper information needed to
complete the assignment or, in the event other extenuating
circumstances occur, the time may be similarly extended. It
is further agreed that if a liquidation of damages is imposed
pursuant to the aforesaid provisions, any money due and
payable to the DEPARTMENT thereby may be retained out
of any money earned by the CONSULTANT under the terms
of this contract.'
This provision can be simplified by eliminating some awkward phrasing
and by aprocess known as tabulation, a drafting technique common in statutory
drafting. Although used less frequently in contract writing, the following
example shows the value of tabulation in that setting:
The Consultant must complete and deliver the work [within
30] calendar days after receiving notice that the Department
has approved this contract. The Consultant may ask in writing
for more time, and the Department may grant it in writing, if
(a) the Consultant does not receive from the Department the
information needed to complete the work; or
(b) there are other extenuating circumstances.
If the Consultant fails to deliver the work by the due date, the
Department may-without having to give notice-choose
either one of the following:
(a) terminate the Consultant's services, and not pay for
services that are submitted after the due date; or
(b) claim liquidated damages of 1/3 of 1% of the total
contract payment for each calendar day late, and subtract
this amount from the total payment.45

44. Kimble, supra note 15, at 84.
45. Id. at 84-85.
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Writing a contract in straightforward, simplified language requires careful
thought about the logical structure of each provision and careful attention to
language and syntax. The rewards are clarity of content and greater confidence
that the provision will not be misconstrued by the parties, nor by subsequent
readers. Many lawyers make the mistake of assuming that if the contract is
grammatically correct and perfectly understandable, it need not be revised.
They can explain it to the client or other interested parties that make inquiries.
A careful drafter will write withan ear toward others that may read the words
outside the drafter's presence, especially those that are not familiar with the
original transaction.
C. Resist Overreaching
Given the opportunity to draft a contract, a lawyer will want to write it in
a way that favors the client. She is ethically obligated to try. Even if the
lawyer's duty is to serve the client's interest exclusively, however, it is not
necessarily in the client's interest to draft provisions as one-sided as possible.
This is especially true with consumer contracts in which a court may declare
unreasonable provisions unconscionable. The risk here is not only that the
provision will be held void, but that the client may end up paying for the
consumer's attorney's fees in any litigation over the issue.4 Punitive damages
might even be assessed if the court feels the consumer was induced by fraud to
enter into the unconscionable contract. Even in nonconsumer contracts, a
contract written in terms unreasonably favorable to one party is likely to be
viewed with a cautious eye in court or arbitration. This suspicion can color the
decisionmaker's perception ofthe fairness and equitable concerns affecting the
dispute.
As a precaution, a forward-thinking contract drafter will, at the very least,
ensure that any potentially onerous clauses are written in clear, concise
language. The cross-collateralization clause in Williams v. Walker-Thomas
FurnitureCo.' was unconscionable largely because it was written in obscure
language that most law students have a difficult time explaining. Clear, plain
language will make it harder for a contesting party to claim fundamental
46. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-10(b)(1) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1998)
(treating deceptive acts of supplier as harsh or one-sided contracts that are also unconscionable);
MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. cb. 93A, § 11 (West 1997) (creating causes of action for unfair trade
practices); MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 445.903(3)(1) (West 1989 & Supp. 1999) (stating that
"[u]nfair, unconscionable, or deceptive methods, acts, or practices in the conduct of trade or
commerce are unlawful"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (stating that
attorney's fees and treble damages are available for unfair trade practices); TEX.Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (West 1987 & Supp. 1999) (stating that consumer may maintain action
for economic damages or mental anguish as the result of any unconscionable action); see
generally Debra T. Landis, Annotation, What Constitutes "Fraudulent"or "Unconscionable"
Agreement or Conduct Within MeaningofState Consumer CreditProtectionAct, 42 A.L.R. 4TH
293 (1985).
47. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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unfairness or surprise.4
If strong client-favorable clauses are essential to the contract, they should
be conspicuous, especially in consumer contracts. Even in commercial

agreements, it is unwise to bury them in the fine print. 9 In some cases, it is
advisable to include a space for initialing particular provisions indicating
express acknowledgment. Courts will find it difficult to set aside a provision
initialed by a party, even a consumer, except in the most egregious
circumstances.

Lawyers should also be careful when drafting provisions that waive the
other party's rights. Waivers in many circumstances are unenforceable by
statute or court decision. 0 Lawyers often think that there is no harm in writing
strong waiver provisions, especially if qualified by the words "except as

otherwise provided by law." They figure that the provision will either be
enforceable or that the other party will not contest its validity. This judgment
can be a grave error in consumer contracts because the provision could violate
a consumer protection statute, subjecting the client to claims for damages and
attorney's fees. 51 In nonconsumer cases, even if no direct liability results from

48. Suggestions for drafting to prevent unconscionability can be found at 5 Forms and
Procedures Under the U.C.C. (MB) 21.03, at 2-30, 2-32 to 2-33, 2-36 (1987). Indicia courts
frequently examine to determine unconscionablepractices maybe found in Wille v. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co., 549 P.2d 903, 906-07 (Kan. 1976).
49. See David Mellinkoff, How to Make Contracts illegible,5 STAN. L. REv. 418,
430-31 (1953).
50. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-25-3(3) (1993) (prohibiting waiver of any consumer
defense, counterclaim, or right); IND. CODE § 24-4.5-1-107(1) (1996) (stating that a party cannot
waive any rights provided in the consumer credit code); IND. CODE § 24-4.5-2-415 (1996)
(stating that a consumer credit contract cannot confess judgment); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 367.979

(Michie 1996) (stating that a rental purchase agreement shall not contain a provision
requiring confession ofjudgment or waiver ofdefenses, counterclaims, or rights ofaction against
lessor in collection of payment); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 11-109(1) & (5) (West 1964)
(stating that rental purchase agreement may not contain a confession ofjudgment or consumer's
waiver of claims or defenses); NEB. REv. STAT. § 69-2107 (1996) (stating that consumer rental
purchase agreement may not contain a provision requiring confession ofjudgment or waiver of
any defense, counterclaim, or right ofaction against the lessor in collecting payment); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 53-181 (c) (1999) (stating that confession ofjudgment by borrower or power of attorney
to confess judgment is absolutely void); cf. U.C.C. § 9-505 (1987) (implying that security
agreement cannot waive debtor's right to insist on disposal of collateral after repossession). For
examples of rights unwaivable by contract, see infra text accompanying notes 54-61.
51. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 28-45-201(8) (1999) (stating that debtor is awarded
attorney's fees for creditor's violation of act); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-5-202(8) (Michie 1996)
(stating that attorney's fees are payable for violating consumer credit act); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 537.5201(8) (West 1997) (providing for payment of attorney's fees for violation of act); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 5-201(a) (West 1964) (entitling consumer to costs of the action
together with reasonable attorney's fee for creditor's violation ofthe consumer credit code); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 37-5-108(6) (Law. Co-op. 1989 & Supp. 1998) (entitling consumer to attorney's
fees for creditor's unconscionable conduct); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (West
1987 & Supp. 1999) (awarding costs and attorney's fees to consumers who prevail in deceptive
trade practices actions); Annotation, Right to PrivateAction Under State Consumer Protection
4ct, 62 A.L.R.3D 169, 178-82 (1975) (discussing state consumer protection legislation and case
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including an unenforceable provision, the provision may nonetheless encourage
a judge or arbitrator to view the party unfavorably. This view could lead to
unwelcome interpretations and rulings, or support a claim that the party acted
in bad faith.
While it is impossible to list all unwaivable rights, "particularly since
enforceability may depend on the circumstances," 2 one scholar has noted the
following likely suspects:53
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
1.
m.
n.

Waiver of constitutional rights; 4
Waiver of all remedies;55
Limitation ofconsequential damages forpersonal injuries
in the case of consumer goods;56
Agreement of purchaser of consumer goods not to assert
defenses against assignees;57
Agreement that a contract shall be incontestable for fraud
or duress;
Waiver of statute of limitations;
Waiver of defenses created by usury laws;
Waiver of statutory exemptions of property from
execution for debt;
Waiver of discharge of a debt in bankruptcy;
Waiver of all rights to counterclaim or set-off;
Agreement that creditor may settle claims against
debtor's insurer;58
Agreement that creditor may treat collateral as it
pleases; 59
Agreement that creditor has an unlimited right to retain
collateral;' and
Agreement that creditor has an unlimited right of entry to
repossess collateral.

The drafting lawyer is put in a difficult position if the client insists on
including aprovision that is likely to be unenforceable. Guidance on the subject
law).
52. BURNHAM, supra note 7, at 39.

53. Id. at 39-40.
54. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94-96 (1972); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick
Co., 405 U.S. 174, 186-88 (1972).
55. See U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1987).
56. See id. § 2-719(3).
57. See id. § 9-206 cmt. 2; FTC Holder in Due Course Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 433.1-.3

(1999).
58. See id. § 9-501(3)(a).
59. See id. § 9-207.
60. See id. § 9-505(2).
61. See U.C.C. §§ 9-503, -504(3).
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is sparse because drafting problems are largely ignored in professional ethics
studies. The lawyer can always withdraw if she finds the client's insistence
particularly repugnant, although this option is not realistic in most
circumstances. The better course will usually be to explain to the client the
legal principles involved and the potential ramifications for both lawyer and
client if an unenforceable provision is included. Explanation of the exposure
62
risks often persuades the client that the provision is not in her best interest.
IV. UNDERSTANDTHECOMMON-LAW RULES OFCONTRACTINTERPRETATION

The common-law rules of contract interpretation, sometimes referred to as
rules or canons ofconstruction, developed as proxies for determining the intent
of the parties when their actual intentions are unknown or disputed. The rules
purport to restate commonly held perceptions about how people understand
language. Although the rules often sound like uncontroversial observations, it
is amazing how often they are litigated. Controversies arise in part because the
rules are riddled with exceptions and are not entirely consistent. A drafting
attorney thus cannot rely on their application with guaranteed results.63
Nevertheless, a good drafter should keep the rules in mind as an important part
of the legal landscape that courts and other decision makers will consider when
deciding what a contract means. The rules are best understood as guidelines,
rather than strict rules, that can help the writer minimize uncertainty in
predicting how an agreement will be applied.
The following discussion illustrates some of the more often-cited
guidelines.
A.

Words Should Be Given TheirPlain and OrdinaryMeaning'

This canon is often used to disarm a party's contention that a word has
some special meaning in the context of the agreement under review. 65 The
judge will apply the "plain" meaning, that is, his or her own understanding of

62. See Justin Sweet, The Lawyer's Role in ContractDrafting,43 CAL. ST. B.J. 362,
365 (1968).
63. Karl Llewellyn wrote the seminal work on interpretive canons, which
demonstrates how judges use the rules selectively in statutory cases. Karl N. Llewellyn,
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or CanonsAbout How Statutes
Are to Be Construed,3 VAND.L. REV. 395,396-400 (1950).
64. Thurman v. Tafoya, 895 P.2d 1050, 1055 (Colo. 1995); American Family Life
Assur. Co. v. Russell, 700 N.E. 2d 1174, 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Sullivan v. Carlisle, 851
S.W.2d 510,512 (Mo. 1993); Oklahoma Ass'n for Equitable Taxation v. City ofOklahoma City,
901 P.2d 800, 803 (Okla. 1995); Ellis v. Rhode Island Pub. Transit Auth., 586 A.2d 1055, 1057
(R.I. 1991); C.A.N. Enters., Inc. v. South Carolina Health & Human Servs. Fin. Comm'n, 296
S.C. 373, 377,373 S.E.2d 584, 586 (1988); cf.Nehf, supra note 2, at 54-63 (discussing "plain
meaning" problems in statutory interpretation).
65. Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Whitelawn Dairies, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 987,994-95 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (discussing evidence thatwhen theparties used "non-exclusive" they meant "exclusive").
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the common usage of the words. This understanding will, of course, be colored
by the reader's education, cultural background, and other life experiences. The
canon may nevertheless be helpful to a drafting attorney, as long as the
lawyer's understanding of plain meaning coincides with that of later readers.
However, the canon can usually be countered by other rules. For example,
the rule "trade usage may vary the ordinary meaning of words" indicates that
common understanding will be superseded by specialized meaning within a
particular trade or sector of commerce.66 Likewise, the rule "technical words

will be given their technical meaning"'6 allows courts to give words the
meaning that best effectuates the parties' intention, 8 rather than the ordinary

meaning, when the court is convinced (1) that an ambiguity exists, and (2) that
the technical meaning is the parties' actual understanding. These exceptions to

the plain meaning rule inject uncertainty into the drafting process, but they can
also create efficiencies. Because of these exceptions, trade usages and technical
words with clear meaning to the parties need not be defined in the contract. If
there is any doubt about the widespread acceptance of the special meaning,
however, the term should be expressly defined in the agreement.
B. Every Partof a ContractShould Be Interpreted,IfPossible,to Carry
69
Out the Agreement's GeneralPurpose

66. C-Thru Container Corp. v. Midland Mfg. Co., 533 N.W.2d 542, 544-45 (Iowa
1995); Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Constitution Reinsurance Corp., 626 N.E.2d 878, 881-82 (Mass.
1994); Hurst v. W.J. Lake & Co., 16 P.2d 627, 631 (Or. 1932) (containing examples of several
trade usages); Weisz Graphics v. Peck Indus., 304 S.C. 10 1,107,403 S.E.2d 146, 149 (Ct. App.
1991) (noting that trade usage and prior course of dealing supplement contract). But see Autrey
v. Bell, 114 S.C. 370, 374-75, 103 S.E. 749, 750 (1920) (finding custom or usage cannot vary
unambiguous express terms).
67. Robin v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.2d 554, 557 (5th Cir. 1977); Thompson v. Arnold,
147 N.E. 2d 903, 908 (Ind. 1958); K & E Drilling, Inc. v. Warren, 340 P.2d 919, 923 (Kan.
1959); Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Lower Yellowstone Rural Elec., 585 P.2d 626, 631 (Mont.
1978); Estate ofHatchby Ruzow v. Nyco Minerals Inc., 666 N.Y.S.2d 296, 298 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997); White v. White, 241 S.C. 181, 188, 127 S.E.2d 627, 631 (1962); Placid Oil Co. v.
Louisiana Gas Intrastate, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. App. 1987, writ ref d n.r.e.).
68. Reed v. Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co., 95 U.S. 23, 30 (1877) (noting that "rigid
adherence to [literal construction] often leads to erroneous results, and misinterprets the meaning
of the parties."); Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388, 398
(Ariz. 1984); McCool v. Ayres, 192 N.E.2d 636, 645 (Ind. App. 1963); Goldsmith v. Knapp, 637
N.Y.S.2d 434,436 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Tanner Elec. Coop. v. Puget Sound Power & Light
Co., 911 P.2d 1301, 1310 (Wash. 1996); cf.In re Estate of Fabian, 326 S.C. 349, 352, 483 S.E.2d
474, 475 (Ct. App. 1997) (noting that "[i]n construing a will, courts should strive to discover and
give effect to the testator's intent.").
69. O'Sullivan v. Bergenty, 573 A.2d 729, 734 (Conn. 1990); E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 498 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del. 1985); McCarthy v. U.S.I. Corp.,
678 A.2d 48,52 (Me. 1996); Spaulding v. Morse, 76 N.E.2d 137, 139 (Mass. 1947); Columbia
East Assocs. v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 299 S.C. 515, 520-21, 386 S.E.2d 259, 262 (Ct. App. 1989);
Patterson v. Bixby, 364 P.2d 10,12 (Wash. 1961); Kuehnev. Samedan Oil Corp., 626 P.2d 1035,
1040 (Wyo. 1981).
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This means the words will be construed in the context of the entire
agreement. The drafter can take comfort in knowing that language will be
construed in a way that promotes, rather than frustrates, the overall purpose of
the agreement. This approach to contract interpretation is an extension of the
"intentionalist view." Rather than discerning the actual intentions ofthe parties,
however, a court looks to the document itselfto identify the contract's essential
purpose. The court then construes words in light of that purpose.
C. Obvious Mistakes of Writing, Grammar, or Punctuation Will Be
Corrected0
Courts will overlook obvious mistakes, either ignoring them or reforming
the contract to correct the problem. This general rule can save the careless
drafter from embarrassment and possible malpractice liability, but it is not very
useful as a planning tool, nor as a substitute for careful proofreading.
D. GeneralTerms Will Be Restrictedin Meaning by the More Specific 7'
Judges invoke this rule to resolve internal inconsistencies in the contract.
The more specific terms will control. A related doctrine is the rule of ejusdem
generis: when particular words are followed by general terms (or vice versa),
the general referto things of a like class with those particularly described.72 For
example, ifa requirements contract for ajanitorial service states that the service
will buy "all of its cleaning supplies (waxes, solvents, glass cleaners, ammoniabased products, etc.)" from a particular supplier, the rule of ejusdem generis
construes "cleaning supplies" to include other similar cleaning fluids but not
hardware cleaning supplies like buffers, mop buckets, and vacuums. If a
broader meaning is intended, the drafter should expressly so provide.

70. Modem Constr., Inc. v. Barce, Inc., 556 P.2d 528, 530 n.5 (Alaska 1976);
Ultimate Computer Servs., Inc. v. Biltmore Realty Co., 443 A.2d 723, 725-26 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1982); Newbem Banking & Trust Co. v. Duffy, 68 S.E. 915, 916 (N.C. 1910);
Schauermanv. Haag, 416 P.2d 88,91 (Wash. 1966); cf.Marksill Specialties, Inc. v. Barger, 428
N.E.2d 65, 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (finding sufficient testimony from which the trial court could
ascertain the terms, even though the contract contained blank spaces); Central Ice Cream &
Candy Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 171 S.C. 162, 164-65, 171 S.E. 797, 798 (1933) (reforming a
contract containing an obvious mutual mistake to express the real intention of the parties).
71. United States v. The Agioi Victores, 227 F.2d 571, 573 (9th Cir. 1955); South
Florida Beverage Corp. v. Figueredo, 409 So. 2d 490,495 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Arnold v.
Burton, 651 N.E.2d 1202, 1205 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Phillips v. Authorized Investors Group,
Inc., 625 S.W.2d 917, 921 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Greger, 559 N.W.2d 854, 864 (S.D.
1997); cf.Rhea v. Maxwell, 116 S.C. 184, 189, 107 S.E. 248,250(1920) (asserting that "general
terms are always restricted to the subject-matter of which they treat.").
72. Chugach Elec. Ass'i. v. Calais Co., 410 P.2d 508, 509-10 (Alaska 1966); BOC
Group, Inc. v. Lummus Crest, Inc., 597 A.2d 1109, 1113 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1990).
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Otherwise the rule ofejusdem generiscould lead to unintended consequences.

73

E. A Court Must Construe a Contract as a Whole and Give Effect to
Each PartifReasonably Possible74
Judges will presume that the contract is internally consistent and not
redundant. They will shun a construction that would render language
contradictory or inoperative. 75 Related rules provide that courts should attempt
to harmonize conflicting provisions to give meaning to each,"' and that a court
"will not construe words in a contract in such a manner as to render them
meaningless."77 Because the court will assume the drafter intended each word
to have meaning, a careful drafter should ensure that each word serves a
purpose and is consistent with other language in the document. If not,
application of the rule can produce surprising results.
F. Whenever Possible, Courts Should Construe Agreements as Being
Valid Rather Than Void 8
A court will presume that the parties intended the document as a whole,
and all of its parts, to have legal effect. Under a related but somewhat
conflicting rule, courts will construe a contract so as to avoid forfeiture.79 The
interplay of these rules can have important consequences. For instance, when
faced with a provision dictating that a general contractor will not pay a

73. Cf.Wolf v. Wolf, 259 N.E.2d 89, 92 (Ind. App. 1970) (observing that "[t]he
doctrine of ejusdem generis is not mandatory and is ignored as frequently as it is applied.").
74. Lempa v. Finkel, 663 N.E.2d 158,166 (Il. App. Ct. 1996); Wiltse v. Cornell, 256
N.E.2d 572, 576 (Ind. App. 1970); Thigpen v. Rothwell, 464 P.2d 896, 898 (N.M. 1970);
Carosone v. Carosone, 688 A.2d 733, 735 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); Brockway v. Brockway, 921
P.2d 1104,1106 (Wyo. 1996).
75. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp. v. Moll, 344 N.E.2d 831,837 (Ind.1976);
George S. May Int'l Co. v. King, 629 N.E.2d 257, 261 (Ind.Ct. App. 1994).
76. FirstNat'l Bank ofCrossett v. Griffin, 832 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Ark. 1992); Central
Bank of Denver v. Deloitte & Touche, 928 P.2d 754, 755 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); EvansvilleVanderburgh School Corp., 344 N.E.2d at 837; George S. May Int'l Co., 629 N.E.2d at 261;
Chergosky v. Crosstown Bell, Inc., 463 N.W.2d 522,525 (Minn. 1990); Christe v. GMS Mgmt.
Co., 705 N.E.2d 691, 693 (Ohio Ct.App. 1997); G.G.A., Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841, 845
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
77. University Casework Sys., Inc. v. Bahre, 362 N.E.2d 155, 160 (Ind.Ct. App.
1977); accord Estate of Savage v. Golub, 392 N.E.2d 263, 266 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1979); Gibbes
Mach. Co. v. Johnson, 8 S.C. 10, 13,61 S.E. 1027, 1028 (1908); Richfood, Inc. v. Jennings, 499
S.E.2d 272, 276 (Va. 1998); Moore v. Johnson Serv. Co., 219 S.E.2d 315, 321 (W. Va. 1975).
78. Bassett v. Desmond, 101 A.2d 294, 296 (Conn. 1953); Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410
N.E.2d 1325, 1331 (Ind.Ct. App. 1980); Garfinkel v. Schwartzman, 254 A.2d 667, 673 (Md.
1969); Bergerv. Victory Realty Trust, 106 N.E.2d 429, 431 (Mass.1952); Duncanv. Brookview
House, Inc., 262 S.C. 449, 457, 205 S.E.2d 707, 711 (1974); Conquistador Petroleum, Inc. v.
Chatham, 899 S.W.2d 439,442 (Tex. App. 1995, writ denied).
79. Dickeson v. Board of Trustees of Chico Indep. School Dist., 204 S.W.2d 418,
423 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947, writ ref'd).
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subcontractor "until five (5) days after Owner shall have paid General
Contractor," a court may not construe this provision as discharging the general
contractor from payment liability if Owner has declared bankruptcy before
paying."0 Thus, even though the court will presume the parties intended the
provision to have legal effect, the court may nevertheless make the general
contractor pay the subcontractor out of its own pocket in order to avoid
forfeiture. If the general contractor wishes to shift the risk of owner's
insolvency to the subcontractor, explicit language is required."'
82

G. Ambiguities Will Be ConstruedAgainst the Drafter

This frequently used canon places a special burden on the drafting party,
particularly with adhesion contracts or other documents that the other party will
not carefully review or negotiate. Without such a review, ambiguous terms may
go undetected. While the drafter has the power to use language favoring a
client's interests, ambiguities will be construed against the client. The court will
have no sympathy for the party that could have prevented the ambiguity.
H. A Court Will Not Presume That the Parties Undertook to Perform
Impossible Acts"3
Contractual obligations will be construed as limited to acts that appeared
feasible at the time the agreement was made.
I. If There Is a Conflict, "Writing PrevailsOver Printing,Handwriting
Over Typewriting, and Typewriting Over Printing"3

80. Thos. J. Dyer Co. v. Bishop Int'l Eng'g Co., 303 F.2d 655, 661 (6th Cir. 1962);
Peacock Constr. Co. v. Modem Air Conditioning, Inc., 353 So. 2d 840, 841-42 (Fla. 1977).
81. See, e.g., DEC Elec., Inc. v. Raphael Constr. Corp., 558 So. 2d 427,428-29 (Fla.
1990) (holding against subcontractor whose contract provided: "No funds will be owed to the
subcontractorunless the GeneralContractorispaidby the owner...."); Elk & Jacobs Drywall
v. Town Contractors, Inc., 267 S.C. 412,417,229 S.E.2d 260,262 (1976) (holding absent clear
expression that general contractor intended to shift credit risk to suppliers and subcontractors,
contracts should not be so construed).
82. Sturgis v. Skokos, 977 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Ark. 1998); American Bldg.
Maintenance Co. v. L'Enfant Plaza Properties, Inc., 655 A.2d 858, 862 (D.C. 1995); Fresh Cut,
Inc. v. Fazli, 650 N.E.2d 1126, 1132 (Ind. 1995); Lacy v. White, 288 N.E.2d 178, 183 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1972); Specialty Restaurants Corp. v. Gaebler, 956 S.W.2d 391,395 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997);
Gallagher v. Fidelcor, Inc., 657 A.2d 31, 34 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995); General Accident Ins. Co. v.
Safeco Ins. Cos., 314 S.C. 63, 72,443 S.E.2d 813, 818 (Ct. App. 1994); Singpiel v. Morris, 582
N.W.2d 715, 720 (S.D. 1998).
83. Knox v. Knox, 59 N.W.2d 108, 113 (Mich. 1953); Car Wash Sys. of Tex., Inc.
v. Brigance, 856 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Tex. App. 1993, no writ); Taylor v. Taylor, 11 S.E.2d 587,
591 (Va. 1940); Schaffer v. Standard Timber Co., 331 P.2d 611, 616 (Wyo. 1958).
84. Scott v. Anderson Newspapers, Inc., 477 N.E.2d 553, 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985);
accordIndustrial Mach., Inc. v. Creative Displays, Inc., 344 So.2d 743, 749 (Ala. 1977); How
v. Fulkerson, 528 P.2d 853, 856 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974); ETA Trust v. Recht, 574 N.E.2d 4, 9 (111.
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In the modem era of word processing, courts should not-have to resort to
this canon very often. However, conflicts do still arise, particularly with preprinted forms that are marked up by the parties before signing.
J. Avoiding the CanonsAltogether
The application of most of the canons can and should be avoided by careful
drafting. They are essentially default rules courts use to determine meaning
when more direct tools for ascertaining the parties' intentions fail. While some
of the canons relate to ascertaining contractual intent (e.g., handwriting prevails
over typewriting), others are simply rules courts use to justify difficult
decisions that must be made (e.g., construe ambiguities against the drafter).
Litigators know that for every rule of construction, a contradictory rule
probably exists that supports a different interpretation. Therefore, while
drafting lawyers should be aware of the canons, they should not rely on them
as an essential part of their drafting strategy. During litigation, the courts'
application of the rules is uncertain. Moreover, during the operational years of
the agreement, the parties or their successors will probably be unaware of these
rules as they attempt to construe the contract. The contract should be written
so that all likely readers will understand it in the same way, regardless of their
knowledge of the law.
V. WORK WITHIN THE RELEVANT STATUTES AND CASE-LAW PRECEDENT

An experienced lawyer should be familiar with the statutory and case-law
precedents governing the particular type of contract being written, and draft
within the boundaries of those rules.
A. Statutory Guidelines
Many statutes require the use of particular language and carry penalties for
failure to comply. For example, the Uniform Commercial Code provides that
a copy of a warehouse receipt must include the word "duplicate." 5 Most states
require a limited partnership to include either the words "limited partnership"
or the abbreviation "Ltd." in their company name. 6 Likewise, a consumer
contract may require certain disclosures, drafted in a particular way."7
Statutes may also prohibit the use of certain terms. Such restrictions often

App. Ct. 1991); Coble Sys., Inc. v. Gifford Co., 627 S.W.2d 359, 363 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
85. U.C.C. § 7-402 cmt. 1 (1987).
86. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-9B-102 (Supp. 1998); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 415-8
(Michie 1997 & Supp. 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-16-2-1(a)(1) (Michie 1999); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 79-14-102 (1996); S.C. CODEANN. § 33-42-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976); W.VA. CODE § 31-111 (1996 & Supp. 1999).
87. See, e.g., FTC Holder in Due Course Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1999).
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apply to consumer contracts and landlord tenant agreements. 8 Other statutes
imply mandatory terms if nothing on the subject is discussed in the agreement.
For example, gap-filling provisions in the Uniform Commercial Code may
supply terms relating to price, place of delivery, time of delivery, and time of
payment. 9 For sales of goods, warranties will be implied unless expressly
disclaimed, and the disclaimers may have to be written in a particular manner
to be effective." Type size, format, and contract design may also be regulated
by statute, especially in credit contracts and insurance agreements. 9'
For all these reasons, contract drafters are usually more comfortable using
form books and software, hoping they were written with the relevant statutory
mandates in mind. However, unless a form was produced for use in a particular
state and is kept current with changes in the law, it may not be reliable. Most
legislative mandates on contract issues are found in state rather than federal
codes, and there is little uniformity among the states outside uniform laws like
the U.C.C. State disclosure laws canbe amended frequently, and changes often
receive little, if any, press in local bar journals. Unfortunately, there is no easy
way to be sure that a form has been drafted in compliance with the relevant
law. A careful drafter will do the required research; others will pray that no
major mistakes are made, or, at least, that none ever come to light.
B. Case-Law Guidance
A less obvious problem, but one more difficult to manage, is keeping track
of relevant case law rulings on specific contract language. Every day judges
construe contract terms in published opinions. If a later case arises involving
the same or similar terms, a court may use a prior decision as precedent. It is
virtually impossible to monitor the case law continually and draft contracts in
accordance with all of these constructions-nor is it worth the effort.
Fortunately lawyers can take comfort in knowing that each case will be decided
in its own context, and that a court will not blindly follow a previous
construction if the facts are materially different. Nevertheless, a good drafting
attorney should have a good feel for the types of provisions that have been
construed in litigation.
88. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-4.5-2-401 to -415(Michie 1996) (covering
consumer credit and leases); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. Ch. 255D, § 9 (West 1988) (addressing
form and content of retail installment agreements); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 567 (McKinney
1990) (mandating the form and content of premium finance agreements); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 27-40-330 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (listing prohibited provisions in residential leases); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4254 (Supp. 1998) (listing prohibited terms in service contracts); see
generally Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, PracticesForbiddenby State Deceptive Trade
Practiceand ConsumerProtectionActs, 89 A.L.R.3d 449 (1979 & Supp. 1999).
89. U.C.C. §§ 2-305 to -311 (1987).
90. U.C.C. §§ 2-312 to -316 (1987).
91. The regulations accompanying the Federal Truth in Lending Act, for example,
have very precise disclosure mandates. See, e.g., Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R.

§ 226 (1999).
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There is case-law precedent, for example, construing the following words
and phrases
that are commonly
used in contracts: "at any time," 92 "accident,"'93
94
95
"and/or,"

"immediate,"

clear of all liens,"

'

"forthwith,"'96 "first day of the year,"'97 "free and
100
99
"forfeit,'1W1 "may, '10 2
CCgross,5
"subject to,

92. Haworth v. Hubbard, 44 N.E.2d 967, 970 (Ind.1942) (stating that "at any time"
is "a relative and flexible term not susceptible of precise definition"); Edwards v. Johnson, 90
S.C. 90, 96, 72 S.E. 638, 641 (1911) (describing "at any time" as an "indefinite phrase").
93. Supreme Council of the Order of Chosen Friends v. Garrigus, 3 N.E. 818, 822
(Ind. 1885) (stating that an "accident" is an event that takes place "without one's foresight or
expectation"); Manufacturers & Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 330 S.C. 152, 161, 498
S.E.2d 222, 227 (Ct. App. 1998) (observing that "[tjhe intent to act, coupled with the intent to
produce the consequences is not an accident as defined by the Supreme Court of South
Carolina."). But cf.State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Moorer, 330 S.C. 46, 58,496 S.E.2d 875,
882 (Ct. App. 1998) (noting that an auto insurance policy can include intentional acts within its
definition of "accident").
94. Jones v. Servel, Inc., 186 N.E.2d 689, 691,693 (Ind.App. 1962) (stating that in
a contract providing for a consultant to be paid for "obligations assumed and/or... services
rendered," "and/or" should be interpreted as a conjunction and not as an alternative); Newlon
v. Newlon, 220 S.W.2d 961,963 (Ky. Ct. App. 1949) (stating that the interpretation of "and/or"
"depends upon the circumstances, and it must be construed to express the intention of the
parties"); Herrick Motor Co. v. Fischer Oldsmobile Co., 421 S.W.2d 58,66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967)
(noting that "or" maybe construed as "and" where such a construction "is necessary to effectuate
the intention of the parties as gathered from the four corners ofthe instrument"); Wood v. Wood,
132 S.C. 120, 125-27, 128 S.E. 837, 839 (1925) (stating that "or" can mean "and" in the
construction of a will if necessary to carry out the testator's intention); Gibbes Mach. Co. v.
Johnson, 81 S.C. 10, 13, 61 S.E. 1027, 1028 (1908) (stating that "and" may be construed as "or"
if demanded by the context and the parties' intention); Victory v. Victory, 399 S.W.2d 332, 338
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1965) (holding that "when 'and/or' is used in a contract, the court may select
the word that fits."). See also Reed Dickerson, The Difficult Choice Between "And" and "Or,"
46 A.B.A. J. 310 (1960) (discussing the uses of "and" and "or" in legal drafting).
95. Gross Income Tax Dep't of Treasury v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., 48
N.E.2d 834, 836 (Ind. App. 1943) (interpreting "immediate" to mean that "the act referred to
shall be completed within such convenient time as is reasonably requisite"); cf.Barkley v.
International Mut. Ins. Co., 227 S.C. 38,44,86 S.E.2d 602,604 (1955) (interpreting the meaning
of "immediate family" as used in an automobile insurance policy).
96. King v. Texacally Joint Venture, 690 S.W.2d 618,620 (Tex. App. 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (noting that "forthwith" has been held to mean "as soon as the required task may
reasonably be performed with diligent exertion").
97. Bojarski v. Ballard, 44 N.E.2d 200, 201 (Ind.App. 1942) (assuming that"the first
day of each year" referred to January 1).
98. Smith v. Toth, 111 N.E. 442, 443 (Ind. App. 1916) (construing "subject to all
liens" in real estate contract to mean that seller must pay full agreed-upon price without
subtracting the cost of discharging liens); Robeson-Marion Dev. Co. v. Powers Co., 256 S.C.
583, 585-86, 183 S.E.2d 454, 455 (1971) (stating that as long as sellers are prepared to use
purchase money to clear liens, closing can take place despite contract requiring clean title prior
to closing).
99. Rourke v. Garza, 511 S.W.2d 331, 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974, writ granted)
(stating that "'subject to' are words of limitation and do not create any affirmative contractual
obligations").
100. Toth, 111 N.E. at 443 (stating that "gross" characterizes a specified sum of
money "before diminution"); Marlton Operating Corp. v. Local Textile Mills, Inc., 137 N.Y.S.2d
438,440 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) (stating that the term "gross income" should be defined in keeping
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5

"activity or event,"'0 6
"due and
"book value,"' 9 "more or less,""'
'2
"indebtedness,"'
"cancel,"" "to wit","' "about,"" 4 "permanent,""' 5 and
"sudden."'" 6 Lawyers who draft contracts regularly should make a habit of
reading through advance sheets or case digests periodically to see current
"proceeds,"'

payable,"' '

with the intent ofthe parties when the document was drafted); Moore v. Berkeley County School
Dist., 326 S.C. 584, 591,486 S.E.2d 9, 13 (Ct. App. 1997) (defining "gross negligence" as an
intentional "failure to exercise a slight degree of care").
101. Zenor v. Pryor, 106 N.E. 746, 748 (Ind. App. 1914) (stating that the term
"forfeit" implies a penalty).
102. Nalle v. Taco Bell Corp., 914 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex. App. 1996, writ denied)
(stating that "[t]he word 'may' . . . does not indicate mandatory requirement.").
103. Beck v. Budd, 88 N.E. 785, 786 (Ind.App. 1909) (defining "to stipulate" as "to
make an agreement, to bargain, to contract, to settle terms, etc.").
104. Shehadi v. Northeastern Nat'l Bank, 378 A.2d 304, 306 (Pa. 1977) (holding that
the phrase "without recourse" must be construed as intended by the parties in light of other
contract terms specifically explaining the phrase); Hall v. James T. Latimer & Son, 81 S.C. 90,
97-98, 61 S.E. 1057, 1059-60 (1908) (holding that inclusion of the phrase "without recourse"
in an agreement will not prevent a party from enforcing its rights under that agreement).
105. Western Ohio Pizza, Inc. v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 704 N.E.2d 1086, 1091
(Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that a purchaser of "as is" property assumes liability for whatever
underground storage tanks and lines may contain, including contaminants).
106. American Family Life Assur. Co. v. Russell, 700 N.E.2d 1174, 1178 (Ind.Ct.
App. 1998) (holding that insured was not "participating in any activity or event" when he was
struck by a train after passing out on the tracks from intoxication).
107. Remsen v. Midway Liquors, Inc., 174 N.E.2d 7, 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961)
(construing "proceeds" to mean "what the litigant would actually receive after the reasonable
costs of the proceeding including attorneys' fees.").
108. Beiger Heritage Corp. v. Montandon, 691 N.E.2d 1334, 1337 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998) (finding that "due and payable" means the amount of the claim or debt is certain but the
day set forpayment has not passed); Grier v. City Council, 203 S.C. 203, 209-10,26 S.E.2d 690,
693 (1943) (limiting the meaning of "due and payable" to the context of a particular transaction).
109. Lambert v. Fishermen's Dock Coop., Inc., 297 A.2d 566, 571 (N.J. 1972)
(stating that no single definition of "book value" is applicable in all cases).
110. Moore v. Harmon, 41 N.E. 599, 600 (Ind. 1895) (stating that when the phrase
"more or less" is not the essence of the contract, but instead is merely used descriptively, "the
buyer assumes the risk of quantity").
111. Halm v. Hincher Mfg. Co., 115 N.E.2d 731,734 (Ind.App. 1953) (finding that
contractual obligation of business seller to "pay and discharge any and all indebtedness" did not
include employees' vacation pay, which did not become due until after sale).
112. Klitzke v. Smith, 91 N.E. 748, 749 (Ind.App. 1910) (holding that "the contract
to cancel the suit [implies the plaintiff's] payment of costs up to that time.").
113. Sawyer v. Churchill, 59 A. 1014, 1015 (Vt. 1905) (stating that the phrase "to
wit" did not have the same meaning when used in a contract as when used in a pleading).
114. Kirwan v. Van Camp Packing Co., 39 N.E. 536, 538 (Ind. App. 1895)
(construing ambiguous term "about" against the drafter).
115. McCutchen v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 153 S.C. 401,413, 151 S.E. 67,71-72
(1929) (holding "permanent" does not always mean "forever" and should be construed
"according to its nature and in its relation to the subject-matter of the contract").
116. Greenville County v. Insurance Reserve Fund, 311 S.C. 169, 176,427 S.E.2d
913, 917 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding "sudden" means "'abrupt' or 'precipitant,' as well as
'accidental'").
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constructions of typical contract terms. Having this knowledge during the
drafting stage is considerably more valuable than learning about it in the course
of litigation.
Finally, and most importantly, lawyers should be aware of important
decisions in which courts have attached grave legal significance to seemingly
insignificant words or omissions in contract drafting. Mistakes in this area can
be made easily and can be costly. Usually these decisions are sector-specific,
and experienced lawyers will be aware of the important ones in their specialty.
Lawyers working in secured financing, for instance, should understand that
words describing the collateral in a security agreement may be specifically
defined in the U.C.C. and in case law.
Many other general rulings cut across subject areas. Three examples worth
mentioning are cases dealing with contract assignments, exculpatory clauses,
and the avoidance doctrine of impracticability. Precedent in each area can
surprise an unwary drafter or delight a party who either knew the rules
beforehand or benefits from them fortuitously.
Dealing with the assignability issue in contract drafting can be simple. The
contract can expressly state that it is assignable in whole, in part, not at all, or
only under certain conditions. Difficulties arise, however, when the contract is
silent on the issue. The general rule is that contracts are assignable unless the
assignment will materially alter the rights or obligations of the nonassigning
party." 7 In deciding whether the assignment will change the contract

materially, contract language can be critical.
The typical scenario involves the nonassigning party complaining that the
assignment will substitute an inferior actor for the original contracting party,
now the assignor. In one often-cited case, an owner of several pizza shops
contracted with a vending machine company to stock and service its vending
machines."' This particular vending company was chosenbecause its president
personally tended to the maintenance, paid commissions in cash, and allowed
the shops to keep a key to the machines, making minor adjustments fast and
easy." 9 When the vending company sold its assets and assigned all its
contracts, the pizza shops terminated the agreement. 20 The court held that the
contract was assignable."' There would not be a material change in service
even though the new company did not pay cash commissions or allow the
shops to keep a key on hand." A deciding factor was that the contract did not
mention these benefits which the non-assigning party now claimed were so

117. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §§ 317-18(1981); cf.Sally Beauty Co.
v. Nexxus Prods. Co., 801 F.2d 1001, 1007 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that a distributorship could
not be assigned without the manufacturer's consent, where the intended assignee was a whollyowned subsidiary of the manufacturer's competitor).
118. Macke Co. v. Pizza of Gaithersburg, Inc., 270 A.2d 645 (Md. 1970).
119. Id. at 647.

120. Id. at 646.
121. Id. at 649.

122. Id. at 648.
Published by Scholar Commons, 1999

27

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:153

important.'"5 The lesson for contract drafters is that all important expectations
should be spelled out in the contract; otherwise, it may be difficult to contend
later that they were material parts of the bargain that would be altered through
an assignment.
Seemingly minor omissions in indemnification or exculpatory clauses can
have disastrous consequences as well. Courts strictly construe these clauses and
have frequently held that if a party is attempting to insulate itself from liability
for its own negligence, the clause must explicitly refer to negligence. 4
Omitting the word can be fatal. Thus, in one recent case involving injuries
sustained at a health club, the court held it was not sufficient to state broadly
that the member
expressly agrees that the Club will not be liable for any
damages arising from personal injuries sustained by Member
or his guest(s) in, on, or about the Club, or as a result of using
the Club's facilities and equipment. Member assumes full
responsibility for any injuries, damages, or losses which may
125
occur ....

Since the word "negligence" was not included, the member's negligence action
was not dismissed.
Impracticability cases provide another example. In a recurring pattern of
cases, a seller who has failed to deliver goods asserts that the breach is excused
because the originating source of supply failed to produce them. Several of
these cases involve farmers who agreed to sell a fixed amount of an agricultural
crop. If the crop is damaged or destroyed by drought, disease, or some other
uncontrollable event, the farmer may assert an impracticability defense.
Holdings in these cases are divided, but they often turn on contract language.
If the contract mentioned the specific farm that would be growing the crops, the
farmers tend to prevail. However, if the contract did not mention a particular

123. Id. at 647-48.
124. See Powell v. American Health Fitness Ctr., 694 N.E.2d 757, 761-62 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1998); Indiana State Highway Comm'n v. Thomas, 346 N.E.2d 252, 259-60 (Ind. Ct. App.
1976); Paro v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 348 S.W.2d 613, 616 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961); Longi v.
Raymond-Commerce Corp., 113 A.2d 69, 74 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1955); Faulk Mgmt.
Sen's. v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 905 S.W.2d 476, 478 (Tex. App. 1995, writ denied).
125. Powell, 694 N.E.2d at 759 (quoting the contract at issue). In holding the
exculpatory clause void, the court applied the more general rule that language must be clear and
unequivocal to obtain indemnification against one's own misconduct. Id. at 761-62; accordDow
Chem. Fin. Corp. v. Marana Assocs., 623 P.2d 836, 838 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Snowhite Dust
Control Servs., Inc. v. Becker, 568 So.2d 110, 111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Dohm & Nelke v.
Wilson Foods Corp., 531 N.E.2d 512, 514 (bnd. Ct. App. 1988); National Hydro Sys. v. M.A.
Mortenson Co., 529 N.W.2d 690, 694 (Minn. 1995); Robert H. Smith, Inc. v. Tennessee Tile,
Inc., 719 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex. App. 1986, no writ).
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source, farmers tend to lose.'26 The rationale is this: if a specific farm was
mentioned, then adequate production from that farm was a basic assumption
upon which the contract was made. If no source was mentioned, no such
assumption arose. Thus a casual drafting decision about whether or not to
reference the farm location can determine the outcome.
A similar division among courts has developed in so-called "middleman"
cases, in which a seller agrees to supply a good to a buyer but then contracts
with another party to manufacture the good. If the manufacturer fails to
produce the good because of bankruptcy or some other circumstance, the
middleman often asserts an impracticability defense. Courts have been more
inclined to bind the middleman to the contract if the contract is silent on the
source of supply, and to release him if the source is referenced in the
agreement.'27 Again, a casual reference to the primary source can be critical in
deciding the case. The lesson for lawyers drafting agreements for middlemen
is to mention the originating source whenever possible. The lesson for the
ultimate purchaser is to omit any specific reference to the originating
manufacturer, unless a particular manufacturer is essential to contract
performance.
VI. CONCLUSION

Lawyers who draft contracts naturally want to write the agreement in a
way that serves the client's interests. However, those interests may change
significantly over time. At the time the agreement is being written, the client's
primary objective may be to make sure that the other party agrees to its basic
terms without significant change or objection. As the agreement is being
performed in the following months or years, the client (or its successors) may
become more concerned with how the contract determines the parties' ongoing
relationship and shapes the resolution of any performance issues that may arise.
When a relationship-ending dispute has occurred, the client will look to the
contract as the source of its enforcement rights and obligations. If the dispute
culminates in litigation, the client will want to know how a decision maker is
likely to interpret the agreement as a blueprint for resolving the matters now
contested.
A cautious contract drafter will write the agreement with all of these
interests in mind, looking beyond the exigencies of the moment and the client's
immediate desires to anticipate how later readers will understand the chosen
language, because the contract serves different functions over time. To do this
work successfully, the drafter will need to (1) structure the agreement using

126. LONL. FULLER &MELVINARONEISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACTLAW 755 (6th ed.
1996) (citing cases holding either way).
127. See Selland Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. King, 384 N.W.2d 490,492-93 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986) (distinguishing Barbarossa & Sons, Inc. v. Iten Chevrolet, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 655

(Minn. 1978)).
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words that convey precise meaning to all potential readers, (2) plan carefully
for the multitude ofpotential interpretive issues that might arise, (3) understand
and apply the standard tools of contract interpretation, and (4) research the
relevant legal rules and precedents that may dictate how subsequent readers
will construe the contract. In accomplishing these goals, there is no substitute
for hard work and experience. Having the proper forward-thinking mindset
throughout the process, however, can go a long way toward ensuring the
contract's successful life during all of its phases, and reducing the chances of
disappointing interpretations down the road.
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